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7Abstract
Only three years after its initial endorsement by the World Bank and the IMF in 1996,
the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) - Initiative was considerably altered and
enhanced. How did this change come about? Neither developments in economic theory,
nor empirical evidence of changed beneficiary behavior can explain the usefulness of
this policy shift. The merits of a shift from ex-ante conditionality to process
conditionality implied by the link of HIPC debt relief to the elaboration of Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) remain equally unclear. However, the change from
the initial to the Enhanced HIPCInitiative can easily be explained as a result of utility
maximization behavior by national and international bureaucrats, politicians and NGO.
A politico-economic model suggests that the overall rise of HIPC default risk and the
symbolic value of the year 2000 have been the two major determinants of the policy
shift.
Zusammenfassung
Bereits drei Jahre nach ihrer Einführung 1996 wurde die Heavily Indebted Poor Country
(HIPC)  Initiative von Weltbank und IWF erheblich verändert und erweitert. Wie kam
es zu diesem Wechsel? Weder neuere Entwicklungen der ökonomischen Theorie, noch
empirische Befunde über ein verändertes Verhalten der Empfängerländer können den
Sinn dieses politischen Kurswechsels erklären. Ebenso unklar bleibt der Nutzen aus
dem Übergang von Ex-ante-Konditionalität zu Prozesskonditionalität, der durch die
Verknüpfung von HIPC Schuldenerlass mit der Erarbeitung von
Armutsbekämpfungsstrategiepapieren (PRSP) entstanden ist. Die Veränderungen lassen
sich allerdings leicht erklären, wenn man sie als Ergebnis eines
Nutzenmaximierungskalküls von nationalen und internationalen Bürokraten, Politikern
und NRO betrachtet. Ein politökonomisches Modell ergibt, dass der allgemeine Anstieg
des HIPC Zahlungsausfallrisikos und die symbolische Bedeutung des Milleniumjahres
2000 als zentrale Determinanten des politischen Kurswechsels betrachtet werden
können.
JEL classification: F34
Keywords: HIPC-Initiative, political economy of aid, international decision
making processes
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91. Introduction
The Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) - Initiative has provoked
considerable economic literature on specific aspects of debt relief and conditionality.
However, the general question of how this enhanced initiative came about has not yet
been addressed. The resulting sudden changes in World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) sustainability criteria and conditionality requirements have
therefore remained largely unquestioned. This paper now attempts to answer the
question why this policy shift has taken place.
After a brief description of the original and the Enhanced HIPCInitiative in section 2,
three hypotheses are advanced to explain the policy shift. These three hypotheses reflect
plausible arguments under the assumption that the change was brought about by an
attempt to improve the efficiency of the original HIPCInitiative. In section 4, this
assumption is dropped and a politico-economic model is developed to explain the
Enhanced HIPC-Initiative as a result of utility maximization by national and
international bureaucrats, politicians and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).
Section 5 provides some empirical evidence for the major forces leading to a new
political equilibrium, and section 6 concludes.
2. What is HIPC?
The HIPC-Initiative was endorsed in its original form in 1996 by the World Bank and
the IMF. The idea was to reduce the debt burden faced by highly indebted and poor
countries if their policy orientation over several years reflected the implementation of
promising macroeconomic and social reforms. For the first time, multilateral debt was
included into the relief program (Holthus 1999, p. 126 and 115).
Two different lines of thought led to this initiative. On the one hand, it follows from
debt-overhang theory (Sachs 1984, 1986; Krugman 1988) that a debt burden over a
certain level heavily impedes the economic development of a country: Financial inflows
dry out due to the risk of insolvency, and investment incentives decrease since foreign
creditors rather than local investors are expected to benefit from returns. On the other
hand, countries ruining their economies through irresponsible policies, should not be
rewarded by debt relief. In their case, debt relief would lead to wrong incentives for a
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continuation of such policies, to the benefit of the powerful elite and to the detriment
of the population as a whole.
To avoid the strengthening of highly problematic political structures and economic
policies, the initial HIPC-Initiative intended to provide debt reduction only after a six-
year period of promising macroeconomic policy (ex-ante conditionality1). Poor
developing countries exceeding a debt-to-export ratio of 200-250% after exploring all
traditional measures of debt rescheduling were considered eligible for the program.
Based on a proposal of the G7 meeting in Cologne, the original HIPC-Initiative was
substantially altered in 1999. The debt-to-export ratio expected to be sustainable was
reduced from 200-250% to 150%.2 Ex-ante conditionality was dropped. Instead,
potential future beneficiaries of the program had to engage in a nation-wide
participatory process in order to develop a national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP) that had to be endorsed by the IMF and World Bank and implemented for one
year. Total relief under the new conditions that both, widen the circle of eligible
countries and deepen the financial impact for each beneficiary, is expected to add up to
over 30 billion US$ in present value terms (2000) as compared to 12.5 billion under the
original framework. This cost is divided approximately in half between bilateral and
multilateral creditors.
While only few developing countries had shown interest in the original program, the
Enhanced HIPC-Initiative (HIPC II) was widely accepted. Until the end of the year
2000, 22 countries had reached the decision point, i.e. they had prepared at least an
Interim-PRSP accepted by the two multilateral agencies. Apparently, within the new
framework, adjustment costs, i.e. the effort of political reform necessary to obtain debt
relief, was perceived to be lower, while potential benefits rose.
                                               
1 Ex ante conditionality is defined here as conditionality requiring certain policy conditions to be met
prior to the disbursement of any credit or grant (see e.g. Vaubel 1994, p. 51). Note that the term is not
used in a uniform way in economic literature. For the exactly opposite use of the terms ex ante and ex
post conditionality see e.g. White and Morrissey (1997, pp. 500 and 504).
2 For very open economies with an export-to-GDP ratio ≥ 30% it can be even lower. The criterion is then
replaced by the debt-to-revenue ratio supposed to be unsustainable above 250%. To benefit from the use
of this alternative debt sustainability indicator, fiscal revenue must be at least 15% of GDP. All debt
indicators are calculated in net present value (NPV) terms.
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3. Why HIPC II?
As long as the mere interest by debtor countries is not considered a sufficient
justification of HIPC II, one might ask why the initial program was so substantially
altered in 1999. This is the central question discussed in this paper. Was it altered
simply because this change was promising in order to increase the efficiency of the
program? Three plausible hypothesis that might explain a higher efficiency of HIPC II
can be formulated here:
 Hypothesis 1: The development of countries eligible for HIPC II suggests that
safeguards against political and economic mismanagement have become less
important than before.
 Hypothesis 2: Economic analysis has evolved and shows that ex-ante conditionality
is ineffective. Moreover, recent research now permits to specify more exactly the
threshold of sustainable debt.
 Hypotheses 3: PRSP are an efficient new instrument to increase incentives for good
policy making. The new obligation to develop PRSP replaces traditional
conditionality by process conditionality. Contrary to what might appear at first
glance, this does not mean that adjustment requirements are effectively reduced.
The rest of this section will examine to which extent these arguments could indeed
justify the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative.
3.1. The development of economic and political management in HIPC
(hypothesis 1)
The shift to HIPC II essentially looks like a major softening of compliance conditions.
This could be based on a generally positive assessment of recent developments in the
debtor countries. Since economic growth, and hence, eventually, the ability to service
ones debt, depend on both, economic and institutional political factors (see e.g. Rodrik
2000; World Bank 2001a), developments in both fields have to be observed. This is
reflected in the set of variables presented in Table 1. The rate of inflation is selected as a
standard indicator of macroeconomic stability. Government preferences as to the
allocation of available funds are measured by the share of health and education
spending on the one hand, and military expenditure on the other hand. The effectiveness
of political institutions is depicted using the Freedom House Indices of political rights
12
and civil liberties. Assuming that the original HIPC-Initiative was based on data of the
beginning, and HIPC II on information on the second half of the 1990s, all data are
compared for the periods 1989-90 and 1996-97.
Table 1: Indicators of economic and political management in HIPC
HIPC having
reached the
decision point by
31/12/00
Rate of inflation,
consumer prices
(%)
Public health and
education
expenditure
(% of GNP)
Military
expenditure
(% of GNP)
Political
rights index1
Civil
liberties
index2
89/90 96/97 89/90 96/97 89/90 96/97 89/90 96/97 89/90 96/97
Benin .. 4.19 .. .. 2.10 1.30 7 2 7 2
Bolivia 16.15 8.57 4.57 8.86 3.30 1.90 2 2 3 3
Burkina Faso -0.56 4.24 3.62 2.53 2.95 2.70 6 5 5 4
Cameroon -0.28 2.86 4.33 .. 1.50 2.85 6 7 6 5
Gambia, The 10.22 1.94 6.50 6.82 1.00 3.75 2 7 2 6
Guinea .. .. 3.87 3.97 1.20 1.50 6 6 7 5
Guinea-Bissau 56.90 49.92 .. .. 2.20 3.60 6 3 6 4
Guyana .. 5.33 10.08 9.76 2.05 1.10 5 2 4 2
Honduras 16.59 22.00 7.73 .. 2.65 .. 2 3 3 3
Madagascar 10.40 12.13 .. 3.20 1.30 1.40 5 2 4 4
Malawi 12.14 23.37 .. .. 1.45 1.00 7 2 6 3
Mali 0.26 3.22 .. 4.01 2.20 1.80 6 2 6 2
Mauritania 9.77 4.65 .. .. 4.30 2.45 6 6 7 6
Mozambique 43.58 26.63 7.69 .. 7.90 2.85 6 3 7 4
Nicaragua 6127.84 10.42 11.29 13.52 21.00 1.60 5 3 5 3
Niger -1.81 4.11 .. 3.89 1.20 1.10 7 7 6 5
Rwanda 2.60 9.71 5.47 .. 2.70 4.85 6 7 6 6
Sao Tome &
Principe
.. .. .. .. .. 1.15 6 1 5 2
Senegal 0.39 2.25 4.79 6.39 2.00 1.65 4 4 3 4
Tanzania 30.84 18.53 4.63 .. 1.90 1.45 6 5 6 5
Uganda 47.28 7.07 .. .. 3.45 4.10 6 4 4 4
Zambia 115.21 35.54 5.56 .. 4.40 1.15 6 5 5 4
Average (of all 22) 21.753 12.83 6.16 6.30 2.593 2.15 5.4 4 5.1 3.9
HIPC so far not
approved (14)
26.07 53.49 4.21 5.05 3.08 3.70 6.5 5.5 5.9 5.5
Non-HIPC Low
In-come Countries
(30)
13.08 15.87 7.07 6.62 6.17 4.39 5.4 5.0 5.3 5.1
1 The Freedom House Index of political rights is a composite index based on an evaluation of the
following aspects: free elections, the real power of elected political representatives, the de facto power of
the opposition, the right to organize in groups, freedom of domination by the military or other powerful
groups, and self determination rights of minority groups. The index is measured on a one-to-seven scale,
with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. For further details see Freedom
House (2001).
2 The Freedom House Index of civil liberties is composed of the four components: freedom of expression
and belief, association and organizational rights, rule of law and human rights, and personal autonomy
and economic rights. The index is measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest
degree of freedom and seven the lowest. For further details see Freedom House (2001).
3 Average excluding Nicaragua as it is an extreme outlier.
Sources: World Bank (2001b); Freedom House (2001).
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Looking at average data for all HIPC having reached the decision point until end 2000,
some positive overall development over the 1990s can indeed be noted. Inflation rates
decreased, the share of GNP spent on public health and education expenditure slightly
went up, while the share spent on military expenditure fell. The institutional indicators
equally improved. This gives some support to hypothesis 1. However, HIPC not yet
accepted for the program do not show the same positive development. The endorsement
process of the Interim-PRSP seems to lead to a certain pre-selection, substituting for the
ex-ante conditionality of the original HIPC program. This does happen, however, in a
less transparent way. Looking beyond the broad averages, it must be noted that a couple
of highly problematic countries slipped through beyond the decision point and thus
belong to the approved HIPC now. Several countries were accepted despite rising
military expenditure (often to more than half of all public education and health
expenditure combined), inflation rates for consumer goods of over 20%, and the
absence of any sound politico-institutional structures.
While, on average, approved and unapproved HIPC appear to have a similar
performance than other non-HIPC low income countries, a comparison with a wider
range of developing countries shows that much more progress could be made. Asiedu
(2001) compares HIPC and 150 other developing countries using a wide range of
institutional indicators. She finds an overwhelming evidence of a significantly lower
performance of HIPC.
Optimism about future development thus appears to be adequate in some, but by far not
in all cases. Safeguards against political and economic mismanagement still seem to be
important. Therefore, substantial doubts can be raised concerning hypotheses 1.
3.2. The development of economic research (hypothesis 2)
Hypothesis 2 suggests, that economic research might be at the origin of the shift from
the original HIPC-Initiative to HIPC II. In particular, as far as the redefinition of the
sustainable debt burden is concerned, one would expect to find some theoretical
background. However, reviewing recent debt overhang literature does not lead to any
concrete findings in this respect. It appears that debt sustainability simply depends on
the productive use of the credits, rather than on any specific debt-to-export ratio
(Nunnenkamp 2001, p. 6).
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In order to check the empirical evidence on potential thresholds, the debt burden of
developing and transformation countries can be compared with inflows of non-
guaranteed long-term commercial bank loans. It is assumed that the private capital
market is a relatively good judge of expected debt sustainability, so that commercial
banks will transfer new funds only if a country is supposed to be solvent in the future.
Table 2 shows that the share of countries who do receive such private inflows does not
vary much with the debt-to-export ratio. Surprisingly, data do not even indicate any
negative correlation. More detailed analyses shows that individual countries like
Nicaragua, Peru and Zambia attract private bank loans even at ratios of over 350%. In
any case, no clear threshold can be recognized, neither at the 150%, nor at the 200% or
250% level. Fixing a particular sustainability limit thus appears to be rather arbitrary.
Table 2: Debt-to-export ratio and private market expectations, 1999
Debt-to-export ratio ≤100% ≤150% ≤200% ≤250%
Share of countries receiving non-guaranteed long-term
commercial bank loans from private banks and other
private financial institutions (net transfers)1
20% 25% 28% 27%
1Calculations are based on a total of 137 developing and transformation countries for which data are
available.
Source: World Bank (2001c)
Let us now come to the question of World Bank and IMF conditionality, i.e. the
necessity of linking resource flows to promising economic policies. Recent economic
studies show that potential positive effects of debt relief crucially depend on the
recipient countrys policy environment. On the basis of theoretical and empirical
research Easterly (1999, p. 30) concludes that only countries with a clear shift in
intertemporal preferences should be granted debt relief. He directly expresses his fears
that the promising ex-ante track record requirement of the initial HIPC-Initiative would
be weakened on the basis of the 1999 G7 proposal in Cologne. Moreover, Berthélémy
(2001) shows that under HIPC II, the positive investment incentives debt overhang
theory expects from debt relief crucially depend on the assumption of a welfare-
maximizing government.
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General empirical research on aid effectiveness reveals that aid funds (implicitly
including funds for debt relief3) only have a positive effect on a countrys economic
development if the country follows a path of sound economic policies (World Bank
1998, Burnside and Dollar 2000). Otherwise, aid and debt relief tend to even have
negative effects since they strengthen regimes without commitment to economic
development. Even if resources are directly spend on poverty reduction or growth
policies, the overall effect may be negative due to the fungibility of aid (Burnside and
Dollar 2000, pp. 848, 863f.). The conclusion is that substantial financial resources
should be channelled only to countries whose governments are really committed to
creating a good policy environment. Selectivity should be based on clear performance
indicators whereby external and climatic factors should of course be given due
consideration (Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001).
The ex-ante conditionality of the original HIPC-Initiative would have provided an
opportunity to check this commitment. Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence on
this particular type of conditionality. It was conceived as a selectivity, rather than a
traditional conditionality mechanism since it would have implied a long-term
observation of individual countries policies before any decision on debt relief was
made. Under very realistic assumptions about the interest structures within developing
countries, strong theoretical arguments can be made for this type of conditionality (see
e.g. Drazen 2001, pp. 38-41).
In particular, long-term observation would have prevented one central problem of
traditional conditionality: the failure to identify real government preferences with
respect to the policies imposed. These preferences are based on the governments own
position as well as on the positions of powerful local interest groups, and both are
difficult to identify in advance. In fact, governments often neither adhered to, nor
implemented the conditions, and were hardly ever penalized for this attitude by a
reduction or suspension of resource flows (Hermes and Lesink 2001, p. 7). White and
Morrissey (1997) formally show that donors generally had no incentive to really insist
on the policy conditions they imposed. Moreover, due to the problem of fungibility,
even if conditionality is formally respected, aid resources may just substitute for other
national resources which are then allotted to different areas in line with national
governments preferences (see e.g. McGillivray and Morrissey, p. 123).
                                               
3 Several donor countries even directly channel at least part of their HIPC debt relief via traditional ODA.
In these cases, repayments continue to be requested, but are reimbursed immediately afterwards by a
corresponding amount of ODA. One example is the French C2D (contrats de désendettement -
développement).
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Finally, one major shortcoming of previous forms of conditionality might have been the
rather strict concentration on macroeconomic policies. Sound macroeconomic
management will only lead to long term positive results if it is embedded in a
framework of other policy measures. In the past, adjustments of conditionality have
already taken place acknowledging for the high importance of human capital
investments, and the effects of income distribution. Recent economic research primarily
points at the importance of institutional factors. Many of the arguments are summarized
in the World Banks World Development Report 2001/2002 (World Bank 2001a). They
had not been taken into account when the original HIPC-Initiative was conceived.
On the basis of this theoretical and empirical record, rather than weakening ex-ante
conditionality requirements, one should have expected an enhancement of selection
criteria including the so far neglected institutional variables. Hypothesis 2 assuming that
recent economic research could build the rational of the shift from the original HIPC-
Initiative to HIPC II must thus be fully rejected.
3.3. The PRSP-process as a new conditionality requirement (hypothesis 3)
The final hypothesis suggests that in fact, conditionality was not really weakened, but
rather enhanced to include precisely the above mentioned new economic insights on the
interrelation between macroeconomic, social and institutional policies. Requesting
countries to develop their PRSP in a participatory process including representatives of
various social and political groups could actually be interpreted in itself as a first step
towards institutional reform. It brings together people of different backgrounds, creates
new networks and represents, in a certain way, a direct training in democratic processes.
Since the process in itself rather than its results are at focus, one might speak of a shift
from traditional to process conditionality (Foster et al. 1999). As Morrissey (2001,
p. 14) correctly points out, bringing together a wide range of different stakeholders and
reaching an agreement on a bundle of macroeconomic, social and institutional reforms
can be an extremely difficult task. If taken seriously, already the selection of
representatives will be very difficult, in particular in countries without any basic
democratic structures. In this sense, the process conditionality of HIPC II might indeed
be harder, rather than softer than the requirements of the initial HIPC-Initiative.
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However, there is no transparency about which of the intended process elements
represent real pre-conditions of HIPC debt relief. In fact, it appears that a number of
Interim-PRSP have been accepted although broad participation was far from achieved
and even involvement of parliament was neglected (Marshall and Woodroffe 2001,
pp. 10f., Booth 2001, p. 11). Often, information is available only in English - a fact
raising some doubts about who are the real participants in the discussion process. In
Rwanda, a Kinyarwanda and French translation of the original Interim-PRSP was
available only in April 2001, about four months after the country had passed the
decision point (Booth, p. 17).
Civil society organizations (CSO) in many HIPC express another important concern:
The whole process is rushed through under tremendous time-pressure (Marshall and
Woodroffe 2001, p. 10 and pp. 31ff., Booth p. 18). Given their limited administrative
capacity and technical knowledge, CSO need some time to gather information and build
their opinion on the various social and economic issues concerned. Otherwise, as it is
now, their input possibilities tend to be very limited.
Thus, initiating PRSP development processes could be indeed an interesting and
innovative tool to promote democratic procedures and institutional development.
However, in order to be effective, such processes need considerable time and effort. The
link to HIPC debt relief which governments wish to obtain as quickly as possible thus
appears to be extremely counter-productive. Process conditionality, though indeed very
demanding if taken seriously, essentially boils down here to the necessity to draft a
program linking traditional macroeconomic policies of the IMF to poverty reduction
strategies of the World Bank. Under the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative, countries are
supposed to develop their own, nationally owned program, but in fact, the low initial
capacity combined with the restricted time-frame of generally less than a year make this
endeavor fully unrealistic from the very beginning.
Let us now consider the implementation phase that follows once the multilateral
agencies have endorsed a countrys Interim-PRSP. During this phase, countries already
receive parts of the relief promised under the program. Its duration was reduced from
three years at the initial HIPC-Initiative to a minimum of one year under HIPC II. This
is all that is left from the initial requirement of a long-term ex-ante track record.
Moreover, monitoring criteria have become very vague. Under HIPC II, countries are
supposed to be reviewed according to their own monitoring criteria lined out in their
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Interim-PRSP. However, most of the strategy papers have actually not defined suitable
monitoring criteria (Booth 2001, p. 11). Nevertheless, these papers have been accepted
by the two multilateral agencies.
Finally, if traditional conditionality is criticized for having not worked well in the past,
it cannot be expected that the type of conditionality introduced with HIPC II will do any
better. Besides the already mentioned problems of high speed, limited monitoring and
low transparency, this is true for at least two more reasons:
• Overly optimistic projections of future economic development, and
• Negative incentives for good policies.
The original objective of conditionality is to lead countries to a new and sustainable
path of economic growth in order to resolve, once and or all, future insolvency
problems. This objective is maintained, in principle, under HIPC II. Consequently,
PRSP are adopted by the multilateral agencies only if projections do not lead to future
debt-to-export ratios above the so-called sustainability level of 150%. However, cross-
country analysis of the existing strategy papers reveals that economic projections tend
to be extremely optimistic. Countries generally expect long-term growth rates of 5-7%.
Many of them plan to base their export growth strategies on the same sectors (such as
tourism) while the resulting competition is not taken into account. Alternative growth
paths in the event of negative external shocks (such as decreasing commodity prices)
are generally not considered either (Marshall and Woodroffe 2001, pp. 17, 25, and 43).
Danielsson (2001, pp. 18ff.) points out that Tanzania for instance, unable to carry a debt
burden of US$ 2 billion in 1999/2000, is expected to achieve future export growth rates
that will make a debt burden three times as high sustainable in 2010. This requires, in
particular, a regular long-term growth rate of non-traditional exports of over 24% per
annum. Slight deviations from these optimistic projections will lead to a debt-to-export
ratio much higher than the current one within the next decade.
The second concern is that, at least until the final calculation of debt relief for each
individual country at the decision point, HIPC II actually creates negative incentives for
good and innovative policy management. Countries do have an incentive to just get
their (Interim-) PRSP endorsed by the two multilateral agencies, but to do no better than
that. Since the so-called debt sustainability level is fixed in advance, and debt relief will
be granted down to exactly that level, countries significantly improving their
macroeconomic policies and approaching this threshold will see their debt relief
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reduced correspondingly. In fact, they might even run the risk of being judged
sustainable cases once they reach the decision point. This would reduce their benefits to
zero. Apparently, countries are effectively punished for their effort of running good
policies.4
All in all, it can be concluded that process conditionality the way it is introduced with
HIPC II is certainly no promising substitute for the ex-ante conditionality of the original
HIPC-Initiative. Therefore, hypothesis 3 has to be rejected. Thus, neither of the three
hypothesis discussed here finds convincing evidence through the above analysis. It does
not appear as if HIPC II could be explained by gains in efficiency as compared to the
original program. Apparently, an alternative explanation is needed for the shift from the
initial to the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative.
4. A politico-economic approach to explain HIPC II
The alternative proposition to be discussed in the following is based on a positive theory
of the rational behavior of all main actors in the political decision making process. Since
decision making at the World Bank and the IMF takes place within broadly similar
structures, the two organizations will be analyzed jointly here. Vaubel (1991, pp. 210ff.)
defines the relevant groups of political actors:
• politicians of the national member governments represented at the Board of
Governors
• national civil servants (national bureaucrats)
• national delegates at the Board of Executive Directors
• international civil servants (international bureaucrats), and
• national and international interest groups, e.g. NGO.
Figure 1 shows how the different groups interact and which channels of influence they
can use in order to bring about specific policy decisions.
National politicians and bureaucrats can exert their influence via the two major decision
making bodies of the IMF and the World Bank in which they are represented: the
Boards of Governors and the Board of Executive Directors. The Board of Governors is
                                               
4 This incentive problem already existed in the original HIPC-Initiative. However, it was mitigated at
least partly through the long-term evaluation of economic policies.
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the highest political authority for all fundamental strategic and financing decisions. As
governors meet only once a year, current decision making processes are delegated to the
Board of Directors. Directors have full-time leadership functions within the
bureaucracies of the two institutions. Since active politicians of national governments
cannot themselves take over this task without giving up their political career, they tend
to send a high level national civil servant. Although leaving the national bureaucracy for
some time, links generally remain strong because the representatives have to be
reintegrated later. Moreover, there is a mutual dependency on information flows.
Figure 1: Political actors in World Bank and IMF decision making processes
          national lobbies / NGO
                lobbying        lobbying
national politicians       national bureaucrats
        collaboration & exchange
       within the Bank and IMF
    international
     bureaucrats
       lobbying
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send political
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Board of Governors
(highest authority at both
IMF and World Bank, joint
annual meetings)
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Board of Executive Directors
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exchange
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ch
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ge
The two Boards both depend on the international bureaucracy to implement their
decisions and to provide them with regular information. Due to the enormous
difficulties to control a huge international civil service, it enjoys considerable power and
can effectively oppose any policy decision by blocking its implementation. At the same
time, through its selection of information flows, it can influence the boards decisions. It
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thus appears that hardly any significant policy change will be carried out at the Bank or
the Fund if this is against the interests of its staff.
Essentially at all levels, interest groups can try to exert their influence through lobbying.
In the case of HIPC debt relief the relevant interest groups are national and international
NGO. They try to convince national politicians and bureaucracies, but are also present
at the international level.
Now all of these actors have their specific interest in the policy decisions around
HIPC II. These interests will be analyzed in order to see whether they can explain the
new orientation of the enhanced debt relief program.
4.1. The political actors’ utility maximization problems
The interests of different political actors can be presented in terms of their utility
functions. Public choice theory generally assumes that the utility of politicians depends
on (expected) votes at the next election, while the utility of bureaucrats depends on their
budget, prestige, pleasant working conditions and room for discretionary decisions.
NGO certainly also care for their prestige and budget which is, after all, a precondition
of their survival and potential growth.5
How does the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative affect the utility of these groups? National
politicians will compare debt repayment to debt relief considering that repayment leads
to fresh resources that can be used to attract new votes. However, as the default risk
increases, the expected value of repayment decreases and, in the extreme case of a
default risk of 100%, utility gains of waiting for repayment become zero.
At the same time, politicians can also win some votes through debt relief. Debt relief to
poor countries has a high moral appeal since it intuitively appears to be an act of charity
for the needy. The utility maximization problem of politicians thus consists in weighing
the potential gains in votes through repayment against the potential gains in votes
through debt forgiveness. Obviously, if it becomes transparent that the default risk is
very high and that repayments can hardly be expected anyway, proponents of debt relief
for charity reasons will value this relief much less. Assuming that knowledge about
                                               
5 For a more detailed discussion of NGOs utility function see Michaelowa 1998 (pp. 70-73).
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default risk is proportionate to the default risk itself, utility gains through debt
forgiveness decrease with the default risk.
More formally, and assuming linear relationships, we can thus express the utility of
politicians in creditor country i with claims against country j as:
Upij =
U0i + Upfij if debt is forgiven
U0i + Uppij if debt is not forgiven
 (1)
Upfij = a0 - a1Rij, a0 ≥ a1 > 0 (2)
Uppij = b0 - b1Rij b0 = b1 > 0 (3)
where:
Upij utility of politicians in creditor country i with claims against country j
U0i utility of politicians in country i independent of their claims against country j
Upfij utility gains of debt forgiveness towards country j
Uppij utility gains of waiting for the payment of country j
Rij risk of default (in terms of probability, i.e. 0 ≤ Rij ≤ 1).
The parameters a0, a1, b0 and b1 are defined to ensure that Upfij(Rij) and Uppij(Rij) ≥ 0 for
all Rij, and that Uppij(Rij=1) = 0.
Now in order to maximize their utility, politicians will compare Upfij(Rij) and Uppij(Rij).
At a default risk of zero, we can expect that the utility of waiting for a repayment is
higher than the utility of debt forgiveness, i.e.:
Uppij(Rij=0) > Upfij(Rij=0)                       ⇔                       b0 > a0 (4)
Otherwise it would be very difficult to explain why the credit was given in the first
place. Parameter restrictions in (2), (3) and (4) imply that politicians optimal choice
always depends upon Rij. Equating Upfij(Rij) and Uppij(Rij) we can calculate the point R
at which politicians are indifferent between the two policy options. At any default risk
higher than R they will opt for debt relief.
Upfij(Rij) = Uppij(Rij)
a0 - a1Rij = b0 - b1Rij
Rij = (b0 - a0) / (b1 - a1) ≡ R , 0 < R ≤ 1 (5)
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the two relevant components of the politicians utility
function and summarizes the above discussion.
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Figure 2: National politicians’ choice between policy options
Uppij
Upfij
Upfij(Rij)
Uppij(Rij)
R   1          Rij
     debt forgiveness
Thus in each creditor country i and with respect to each debtor country j national
politicians will favor debt relief if Rij > R. The default risk Rij depends on a number of
characteristics of both partners such as the retaliation power of the creditor, cumulated
arrears, and the debtors total debt with respect to the size of his economy. We may thus
write:
Rij = (GNPi, (X+M)ij, ODAij, (M-X)j, arrearsj, ΣDebtj)  (6)
The first three terms represent the economic power of the creditor and the debtors
dependency on bilateral trade and aid (Official Development Assistance, ODA). These
factors can be assumed to diminish the risk of default since they represent the retaliation
potential of the creditor. In contrast, the debtors overall current account deficit (M-X)j,
i.e. his continuous need for external finance, arrears that he has already accumulated,
and total accumulated debt imply an increasing risk of default.
Let pij = p(Rij > R) denote the probability that the politicians of country i are willing to
forgive the debt of country j, and (1  pij) = p(Rij ≤ R) the probability that they do not.
Obviously pij depends on the same variables as Rij.
Now for several countries, say the G7, to reach a consensus on joint debt relief for
country j the probability is:
pj = p(∩7i=1(Rij > R)) = p1j  p(R2j > R  R1j > R)  p(R3j > R  (R1j > R)∩(R2j > R))   (7)
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For I creditor countries to agree on debt relief for J different debtor countries, it is:
pall = p(∩Jj=1[∩Ii=1(Rij > R)]) (8)
This probability depends on all explanatory variables of Rij (for all i and j), notably on
accumulated debt and arrears. Thus rising debt stock and arrears as observed during the
last three decades lead to a rising probability of joint debt relief.
Nevertheless, the probability that politicians of all relevant creditor countries find it
optimal to simultaneously forgive the debt of a considerable number of developing
countries, appears to be rather small. By definition, pall ≤ pj ≤ pij. Since creditor countries
vary considerably with respect to their retaliation potential and country focus, there is
only little probability that they reach R at exactly the same point of time and with
respect to the same debtor countries. Now if politicians in country i find it individually
optimal to proceed with debt relief for country j, they will do so without losing time and
even if they dont find a partner for joint action. In the past, this bilateral relief has
mainly taken place indirectly, via an input of fresh ODA resources. In an econometric
study, Birdsall, Claessens and Diwan (2001) show to what extent debt has affected the
provision of new aid resources since the late 1970s. Bilateral aid reduces the default risk
Rij faced by i for the remaining credits outstanding from country j (see equation (6)).
Thus if now, another creditor starts to think about debt relief for this same debtor,
politicians in country i will no longer join the effort. Thus bilateral action reduces the
probability pall of joint action by all donors.
Conventional debt overhang theory would add that the probability to reach an
agreement will be reduced because of free riding behavior among creditors. This point
does not seem very convincing here since the group of major creditors as represented at
G7 meetings, is sufficiently small to reach an agreement if this is indeed of interest to
all participants. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the probability of a
comprehensive multilateral debt reduction program such as HIPC II with 41 potentially
eligible countries is generally not very probable to be implemented. Although the
probability rises over time with increasing cumulated debt and arrears, a temporary
shock would be needed to push politicians of various countries across the threshold R at
the same time. We will see whether this might have come about through the interaction
with other groups of political actors.
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Let us now consider national bureaucrats in donor countries. Their utility depends on
their budget, prestige, pleasant working conditions and the room for discretionary
decisions. The effect of debt relief on the budget depends on whether any payback from
the debtor can really be expected. This expectation depends on the default risk Rij. If
repayments can be expected, they are of interest for bureaucrats only if resources flow
back into their own administration and not into some general pool at the discretion of
politicians. Finally, the effect on bureaucrats budget depends on whether there is an
agreement on the additionality of funds earmarked for debt relief, or whether the relief
draws on the general aid budget. At one extreme, the full NPV of relief will be added to
their budget, which is the option bureaucrats will obviously favor. Since expected value
of repayments is generally lower than the NPV of outstanding debt, they would actually
receive more funds than they could ever have expected to recover from the debtors.
Estimations show that overall, HIPC debt is probably worth only about 10% of its NPV
(Cohen 2000, p. 22). In this case, debt relief under full additionality will actually
increase their budget by 90% of outstanding debt.
At the other extreme, they do not receive any extra funds and debt relief is financed out
of unchanged ODA, i.e. there is no additionality. Of course, there is a multitude of
intermediate financing possibilities. However, we can suppose that, other things being
equal, bureaucrats will oppose any debt relief program that does not provide for a
minimum compensation covering at least their real budgetary loss.
Formally we can write:
Compmax = NPV  ∆BT = ∆BT(Rij) = ∆BF(Rij) + NPV (9)
Compmin = Comp(Rij) = - ∆BF(Rij)  ∆BT = 0,     -NPV ≤ ∆BF(Rij) ≤ 0 (10)
with
Compmax compensation under full additionality
Compmin minimum compensation bureaucrats are willing to accept
∆BT total budget effect for bureaucrats
∆BF budget effect of debt forgiveness (without compensation)
This is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The effect of debt relief on national bureaucrats’ budget
    ∆B
   NPV Compmax
         ∆BT(Compmax) = ∆BF(Rij) + NPV
         Compmin
∆BT(Compmin) = 0 1     Rij
      ∆BF(Rij)
  -NPV
Note that, under purely budgetary considerations, the minimum amount of
compensation bureaucrats require to accept the deal (Compmin) just corresponds to the
amount of resources politicians expect to lose through debt forgiveness. These are the
funds lost for the donor country as a whole. Politicians will not agree on a compensation
to bureaucrats higher than that, otherwise they will handle the relief without the
intermediary of the national aid administration.6
However, in their utility maximization process, bureaucrats do not consider the budget
alone. The impact on prestige, pleasant working conditions and room for discretionary
decisions also depends on the concrete arrangements. One particular aspect of the
HIPC II debt relief is the link to poverty reduction through the elaboration of PRSP.
Now, in particular since the beginning of the 1990s, the aid bureaucracy finds itself
under increasing pressure to raise the share of resources spent into poverty reduction.
The peer reviews of the OECDs Development Assistance Committee (DAC) tend to
focus on this issue (see e.g. OECD/DAC (1998, pp. 31ff.). Special DAC guidelines for
donor countries poverty reduction strategies have just been published as a new point of
reference (OECD/DAC 2001). However, clearly poverty related programs are very
                                               
6 In the framework of a principal-agent model one might also assume that the bureaucracy has better
information on real default risk than national politicians, so that the former tend to exaggerate real
expected losses in order to gain higher compensation. In order to reduce the complexity of the
model, these aspects are not taken into account here.
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difficult to design and generally do not consume huge sums of money. Other projects
are much more easy to plan, to implement and to monitor. Now the invention of PRSP
makes work much easier for the aid administration in donor countries. Whatever project
it may be, if it can be adjusted to fit into a PRSP, it automatically obtains the positive
stamp of poverty reduction. This simultaneously contributes to a reduced workload and
a rising prestige of the aid administrations development assistance program. In
addition, national bureaucrats can get directly involved in drafting PRSP, thereby
increasing their power and influence.
These side effects of the HIPC implementation process will increase national
bureaucrats willingness to engage in debt relief. If budgetary effects alone are taken
into account, Compmin is required to maintain a constant utility level. Now considering
the effects on prestige and working conditions, bureaucrats receiving Compmin will not
just be indifferent but clearly in favor of debt relief. In fact, this implies that even if they
do not receive a full compensation of their real budgetary losses, they will still accept
the debt relief initiative.
Summing up the discussion on politicians and bureaucrats in creditor countries, we can
say that once politicians have come to an agreement such as HIPC II, this agreement is
very unlikely to face opposition by national bureaucrats even if the aid resources spent
for this purpose are not fully compensated by additional ODA funds.
To complete the discussion of the national political processes let us now consider the
position of NGO. NGO have always fought for debt relief to poor countries. The high
moral appeal of the argument that poor people in developing countries should not suffer
from malnutrition and lack of basic health and education because their governments
have to pay back loans to the industrialized world is used by NGO for their own
purposes. Complicated questions such as who will really reap the benefits of these funds
and whether they might not provoke counter-incentives to good government policies
tend to be overlooked by public opinion. Therefore, through campaigns on debt relief,
NGO can easily gain publicity which in turn helps them to raise funds for their other
activities. However, as it is difficult to sustain a long time public interest for always the
same question, NGO tend to focus their major campaigns on special events or symbolic
years. In 1988 for instance, the annual meeting of the World Bank and IMFs Board of
Governors in Berlin was used for coordinated and intensive lobbying for debt relief. In
1996, they organized the campaign 50 years is enough referring to the activities of the
Bretton Woods institutions in general. Now, a new and particularly well suited
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opportunity arose with the year 2000, entrance to the new millenium and biblical year of
debt forgiveness. With the Jubilee 2000 Coalition Initiative a huge NGO campaign
for debt relief was launched involving all major development NGO including the big
churches. Planning for this event started as early as 1994, and by 1997, many
organizations all over the world had joint the network (Menzies 2001, pp. 6ff.). Around
that time it must have been clear to all observers that debt relief would become a major
issue of public debate during the year 2000.
Now what does this mean for the utility maximization of bureaucrats and politicians in
creditor countries? With public interest turned onto debt issues by NGO campaigns,
politicians can expect that debt forgiveness will not go unnoticed but obtain broad
public support. At high times of NGO campaigning they can thus expect to attract more
votes through debt relief than they would at other times. Since this is true irrespective of
default risk Rij , we can rewrite national politicians utility from debt relief (see equation
(2)) for periods of major NGO lobbying as:
Upfij = a0 - a1Rij + C, C > 0,   (11)
where C is a constant term reflecting the impact of NGO activities on voters behavior.
Calculating the default risk above which politicians in creditor country i will find it
optimal to forgive the debt of country j now yields:
R = [b0  (a0 + C)] / (b1  a1) < R = (b0  a0) / (b1  a1) . (12)
This means that due to NGO campaigning, creditor countries politicians will find it
optimal to forgive the debt at a lower level of default risk than before. They will thereby
reach a higher level of utility (Upfij(R)). This Jubilee 2000 effect is illustrated in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: The “Jubilee 2000 effect” on national politicians’ utility maximization
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     debt forgiveness
Since the Jubilee 2000 effect occurs in all creditor countries and with respect to all
debtor countries, the probability of reaching an agreement on comprehensive debt relief
rises from pall to pall.
pall = p(∩Jj=1[∩Ii=1(Rij > R)]) > pall = p(∩Jj=1[∩Ii=1(Rij > R)]) (13)
Moreover, it is important to note the additional dynamic effect not captured by this
inequality: Lobbying focussed on a particular single year leads to a simultaneous shift
of all creditor-debtor relations with default risks between R and R across the threshold
of optimality for debt relief. This implies that the coordination problem arising through
immediate individual action after crossing the threshold will be far less relevant here.
Together with the general rise of default risks Rij over time, the Jubilee 2000 effect
may thus be responsible for the unprecedentedly comprehensive debt relief initiative
launched by government representatives at the G7 meeting 1999 in Cologne. As
discussed above, opposition from national bureaucrats was not to be expected as long as
they were promised some budgetary compensation - not even necessarily as high as real
budgetary losses. It remains to be discussed how this could translate into an
international agreement involving the World Bank and the IMF and reducing the
conditionality requirements imposed by these agencies.
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Since according to equation (6), each Rij depends on total accumulated debt and total
arrears of country j, an individual creditor will benefit from other creditors equally
granting debt relief. G7 creditor countries will thus also benefit from the forgiveness of
World Bank and IMF loans and they will try to pass corresponding decisions at the
Boards of these organizations. It is probable that they will be supported by governors
and executive directors of other OECD creditor countries where the national political
decision making process follows the same lines as outlined above. Poor debtor countries
potentially eligible for debt relief, will certainly not oppose the agreement, while the
remaining countries will not show any particular preferences as long as they are not
expected to participate in the financing of the relief program. There are thus very high
chances of a broad consensus in favor of debt forgiveness.
For the international bureaucracy, under certain conditions, a program such as HIPC II
can be a welcome chance of improving their public image, replenishing their funds,
enhancing lending activities and dissimulating their debtors upcoming default
problems. Just as for national politicians and bureaucrats, improving their image
through debt relief works particularly well at times during which NGO focus their
lobbying activities on the moral obligation to deliver poor countries from their debt
burden. At these times, public interest in debt relief is particularly high and the
international bureaucracies can expect higher prestige if they respond to this public
interest. Moreover, debt relief leads to benefits from more consensual working relations
with NGO. It can thus be expected that the Jubilee 2000 effect plays an as important
role for the utility maximization process of international bureaucracies, as it does for
national decision making processes.
At the same time, replenishing the funds for new lending and dissimulating upcoming
default problems is the more relevant, the higher the default risk of debtor countries
with respect to multilateral debt. While HIPC I had left these financial issues largely
unresolved, HIPC II led to the creation of the IMFs Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF) replacing the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), and to
considerable bilateral commitments to the HIPC Trust Fund managed by the World
Bank. These resources linked to multilateral debt relief do not create any additional
financing capacity as long as full repayment of loans can be expected. With increasing
default risk, however, the funds received for debt forgiveness in NPV terms exceed
repayment expectations, and the international bureaucracy benefits from real budgetary
gains.
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Since the utility international civil servants derive from debt relief thus depends on just
the same parameters as those relevant for national politicians and bureaucrats, it is
highly probable that at times the official decision making boards of IMF and World
Bank come to an agreement on debt relief, this will also meet the utility maximization
requirements of the international bureaucracy.
Once a common agreement is reached, funds will be made available by member states.
Now as the implementation of debt relief is left to international bureaucrats, they will
have to find ways how to spend these funds. Rapid debt relief for a considerable number
of developing countries would not have been possible under the initial HIPC-Initiative
since developing countries governments were simply not interested at the given strict
policy requirements. At unchanged world demand, World Bank and IMF had to reduce
the conditionality requirements attached to their lending. Consequently, the shift to
HIPC II implied a considerable weakening of conditionality.
More formally, and following Vaubel (1991, pp. 233ff.), international bureaucrats
utility (UIB) can be modeled, ceteris paribus, as a positive function of both lending (L)
and policy conditionality (P). While lending is important in order to prove budgetary
requirements, policy conditionality positively effects the bureaucrats discretionary
power. The utility of international bureaucracies is constrained by the demand for their
lending (Ld) and the quota and / or financing facilities (F) from which they can lend.
Now imagine that, initially, the financing constraint is binding since original financing
facilities have dried out due to missing flow back from earlier lending. Figure 5
illustrates that this leads to a relatively high policy conditionality (P). Relaxing the
financial constraint from F to F implies a higher level of utility for international
bureaucrats (UIB) at weakened policy requirements (P).
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Figure 5: International bureaucrats’ utility maximization and its effect on
conditionality
Policy
conditio-
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         Ld
     F  F   Lending (L)
Source: Vaubel (1991, p. 234, Figure 1b).
It becomes clear that (as interest rates are fixed in advance at almost negligible levels)
the degree of conditionality can actually be interpreted as the price on the market for
international lending. When IMF and World Bank funds are easily available, i.e. when
the lending constraint F is relaxed through the replenishment of funds to F, this price
will go down. Thus HIPC II necessarily implies a reduction of conditionality. This is
precisely the phenomenon observed which we had difficulties to explain on the grounds
of normative economic reasoning.
4.2. Empirical evidence
As we have seen, positive analysis can provide a theoretical explanation for the
Enhanced HIPC-Initiative. However, it seems important to examine to what extent this
theoretical explanation is consistent with empirical evidence. In particular, the argument
that HIPC II was endorsed in 1999 rather than at any other point of time, relies on two
pillars:
 the Jubilee 2000 effect, and
 the overall increase of poor development countries default risk over time.
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Figure 6 summarizes the importance of these two factors for the decision making
process of virtually all relevant actors determining World Bank and IMF policy.
Figure 6: Utility from comprehensive debt relief for the World Bank and IMF
With generally increasing risk of default, expected repayments decrease, and so do the
utility losses induced by real negative budget effects of debt relief (lowest line). At the
same time, public appreciation of debt relief rises around certain years of particular
NGO lobbying such as, in particular, the Jubilee 2000 Initiative at the beginning of the
new millenium. This public appreciation translates into higher votes for politicians and
higher prestige and / or more pleasant working conditions for bureaucrats. In 1988, this
campaigning had no effect since at least multilateral donors could still expect a pretty
complete repayment of their debt. In 1996, the campaign 50 years are enough and the
prevailing default risk were still not fully sufficient to shift total utility of debt relief
significantly above the level of indifference (∆Utility = 0). Therefore, the initial HIPC-
Initiative was endorsed, but never reached a significant scale. In the year 2000,
however, total utility of comprehensive debt forgiveness clearly became positive.
Let us first check the empirical evidence of an increasing default risk, both with respect
to selected individual creditor countries and with respect to lending by multilateral
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institutions. From equation (6) we retain those determinants of Rij that do not depend on
the creditors themselves7, i.e. total debt, arrears, and the balance of trade deficit. The
development of these indicators over time is presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Selected indicators of HIPC default risk over time1
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
Total long-term debt outstanding and disbursed
(LDOD)
9,567 26,118 59,360 111,879 167,807 175,953
Debt forgiveness or reduction .. .. .. -4,147 -2,142 -4,912
Multilateral debt/total debt (%) 11.6 13.6 16.0 20.0 22.4 27.6
Interest arrears on LDOD 121 911 2,764 6,154 15,839 18,007
Principal arrears on LDOD 172 1,128 3,123 11,431 33,833 43,094
Current account deficit2 .. .. 9,999 11,491 17,447 20,075
1In millions of current US$, if not otherwise specified.
2Excluding transfers, i.e. only imports minus exports of goods and services. Note that foreign direct
investment that could, in principle, offset the deficit, is negligible for HIPC.
Source: World Bank (2001c).
We note that indeed, total outstanding debt and arrears steadily increased over time,
despite some bilateral debt forgiveness already taking place since the mid 1980s. The
increase slowed down in the mid 1990s when donors started to replace loans by grants.
At the same time, the share of multilateral credits within total credits rose continuously.
Finally, net imports were increasing, so that HIPCs need for external finance rose
rather than fell over time. Towards the end of the 1990s, it could obviously not be
expected that they would ever be able to fully pay back their credits out of their own
resources.
Let us now check the evidence for the Jubilee 2000 effect. If there were no special
effect leading to a particular increase in utility from debt relief for the relevant political
actors during the year 2000, we would expect a rather continuous picture of countries
passing the HIPC decision point. Moreover, while each HIPC would probably try to
speed up the process in order to benefit from relief measures as quickly as possible, we
could expect the World Bank and the IMF to watch over a thorough PRSP development
and to insist on sufficient time to allow for broad participation.
                                               
7 The latter are relevant only relative to other donors and not for the donor community as a whole.
35
Now looking at country-case studies of PRSP or Interim-PRSP development, it seems
as if the World Bank and the IMF, rather than the countries themselves, created the time
pressure that often severely impeded serious participation by CSO (see e.g. Marshall
and Woodroffe 2001, p. 31). Moreover, it appears as if every possible effort had been
made, to pull the endorsement date of the Interim-PRSP within the year 2000. Figure 7
shows, that during the year 2000, 22 out of 41 HIPC got their Interim-PRSP accepted by
the international agencies. Almost half of them passed the decision point just before the
end of the year. Of the remaining 19 countries theoretically eligible, only one passed the
decision point until August 2001. Evidence is thus clearly consistent with the theoretical
argument of a Jubilee 2000 effect.
Figure 7: Number of Interim-PRSP endorsed by the World Bank and IMF
Sources: IMF/IDA (2001, p. 5) and World Bank (2001d, p. 13).
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5. Conclusions
Comprehensive debt relief as it is currently delivered under HIPC II is difficult to
explain on the grounds of normative economic analysis. A politico-economic model,
based on the utility maximization of all political actors participating in the decision
making process, does, however, give some insight into how the Enhanced HIPC-
Initiative might have come about. It appears that, when politicians and bureaucrats
realize that default risk becomes very high, they prefer to grant debt relief in order to
mask their imprudent lending and to sell the renunciation of funds as an innovative
poverty reduction measure.
NGO lobbying, in particular via focused and well organized activities at specific
occasions such as the beginning of the new millenium, increases their chances of
obtaining public credit for debt relief. This leads to the Jubilee 2000 effect
simultaneously shifting the utility of many national and international political actors
across the threshold of positive utility. Moreover, the Jubilee 2000 effect speeds up
the political process of debt relief since all political actors try to reap the benefits of
short-term public attention onto this particular policy issue.
However, offering a debt relief policy package and attracting demand among the
eligible countries are two different things. While extra funds for debt relief are made
available, this implies real benefits to HIPC only to the extent that they initially
intended to pay back the loans which will be forgiven. Moreover, if debt is cancelled,
they might lose an important lever for future ODA. In any case, they will not demand
these extra funds at the prevailing high price of IMF and World Bank conditionality.
Thus, once agreements on the provision of debt relief have been achieved, the
implementation by international bureaucrats requires a reduction of conditionality in
order to provoke demand for the new policy package.
Finally we end up with a policy product characterized by a multitude of at least partly
contradictory objectives and implemented at a speed that in itself seriously interferes
with the basic ideas of the process.
While the initial HIPC-Initiative was oriented towards rewarding countries for a long-
term record of sound economic and social policies, the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative
responds to the pressure not to wait for so long. Incentives for good policy orientation
have thus become less relevant and policy shifts which could lead to a long-term
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sustainable economic development have become less probable than before.
Straightforward and transparent measures such as simply clearing the books of all
credits with default risks close to 100%, remain as inconsistent with the new political
equilibrium as they have been before.
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Abbreviations
CSO Civil Society Organizations
DAC Development Assistance Committee
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country(ies)
HIPC II Enhanced HIPC-Initiative (endorsed in 1999)
IDA International Development Association
IMF International Monetary Fund
LDOD Long-term Debt Outstanding and Disbursed
NGO Non-Governmental Organizations
NPV Net Present Value
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper(s)
